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| author | Kernel Build Daemon <kbuild@suse.de> | 2019-10-08 07:20:37 +0200 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Kernel Build Daemon <kbuild@suse.de> | 2019-10-08 07:20:37 +0200 |
| commit | a12d3b0a62595ce8248ef1bd294c9d39872a3685 (patch) | |
| tree | b49e50fd458baf3f7d45c79bb0e86831628c3937 | |
| parent | 62cd4026a013b87b05a0763cc39d0cf7fab4f31b (diff) | |
| parent | 3106fa5672fb170d26ee3a4d601510ee85099d4c (diff) | |
Merge branch 'SLE15' into SLE15-AZURErpm-4.12.14-5.41--sle15-updatesrpm-4.12.14-5.41
4 files changed, 267 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/patches.suse/0001-xen-netfront-do-not-use-0U-as-error-return-value-for.patch b/patches.suse/0001-xen-netfront-do-not-use-0U-as-error-return-value-for.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..53915468b5 --- /dev/null +++ b/patches.suse/0001-xen-netfront-do-not-use-0U-as-error-return-value-for.patch @@ -0,0 +1,99 @@ +Patch-mainline: v5.4-rc2 +Git-commit: a761129e3625688310aecf26e1be9e98e85f8eb5 +References: bsc#1065600 +From: Dongli Zhang <dongli.zhang@oracle.com> +Date: Tue, 1 Oct 2019 21:56:41 +0800 +Subject: [PATCH] xen-netfront: do not use ~0U as error return value for + xennet_fill_frags() + +xennet_fill_frags() uses ~0U as return value when the sk_buff is not able +to cache extra fragments. This is incorrect because the return type of +xennet_fill_frags() is RING_IDX and 0xffffffff is an expected value for +ring buffer index. + +In the situation when the rsp_cons is approaching 0xffffffff, the return +value of xennet_fill_frags() may become 0xffffffff which xennet_poll() (the +caller) would regard as error. As a result, queue->rx.rsp_cons is set +incorrectly because it is updated only when there is error. If there is no +error, xennet_poll() would be responsible to update queue->rx.rsp_cons. +Finally, queue->rx.rsp_cons would point to the rx ring buffer entries whose +queue->rx_skbs[i] and queue->grant_rx_ref[i] are already cleared to NULL. +This leads to NULL pointer access in the next iteration to process rx ring +buffer entries. + +The symptom is similar to the one fixed in +commit 00b368502d18 ("xen-netfront: do not assume sk_buff_head list is +empty in error handling"). + +This patch changes the return type of xennet_fill_frags() to indicate +whether it is successful or failed. The queue->rx.rsp_cons will be +always updated inside this function. + +Fixes: ad4f15dc2c70 ("xen/netfront: don't bug in case of too many frags") +Signed-off-by: Dongli Zhang <dongli.zhang@oracle.com> +Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> +Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> +--- + drivers/net/xen-netfront.c | 17 +++++++++-------- + 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c b/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c +index e14ec75b61d6..482c6c8b0fb7 100644 +--- a/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c ++++ b/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c +@@ -887,9 +887,9 @@ static int xennet_set_skb_gso(struct sk_buff *skb, + return 0; + } + +-static RING_IDX xennet_fill_frags(struct netfront_queue *queue, +- struct sk_buff *skb, +- struct sk_buff_head *list) ++static int xennet_fill_frags(struct netfront_queue *queue, ++ struct sk_buff *skb, ++ struct sk_buff_head *list) + { + RING_IDX cons = queue->rx.rsp_cons; + struct sk_buff *nskb; +@@ -908,7 +908,7 @@ static RING_IDX xennet_fill_frags(struct netfront_queue *queue, + if (unlikely(skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags >= MAX_SKB_FRAGS)) { + queue->rx.rsp_cons = ++cons + skb_queue_len(list); + kfree_skb(nskb); +- return ~0U; ++ return -ENOENT; + } + + skb_add_rx_frag(skb, skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags, +@@ -919,7 +919,9 @@ static RING_IDX xennet_fill_frags(struct netfront_queue *queue, + kfree_skb(nskb); + } + +- return cons; ++ queue->rx.rsp_cons = cons; ++ ++ return 0; + } + + static int checksum_setup(struct net_device *dev, struct sk_buff *skb) +@@ -1045,8 +1047,7 @@ static int xennet_poll(struct napi_struct *napi, int budget) + skb->data_len = rx->status; + skb->len += rx->status; + +- i = xennet_fill_frags(queue, skb, &tmpq); +- if (unlikely(i == ~0U)) ++ if (unlikely(xennet_fill_frags(queue, skb, &tmpq))) + goto err; + + if (rx->flags & XEN_NETRXF_csum_blank) +@@ -1056,7 +1057,7 @@ static int xennet_poll(struct napi_struct *napi, int budget) + + __skb_queue_tail(&rxq, skb); + +- queue->rx.rsp_cons = ++i; ++ i = ++queue->rx.rsp_cons; + work_done++; + } + +-- +2.16.4 + diff --git a/patches.suse/0001-xen-xenbus-fix-self-deadlock-after-killing-user-proc.patch b/patches.suse/0001-xen-xenbus-fix-self-deadlock-after-killing-user-proc.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..30bb788a40 --- /dev/null +++ b/patches.suse/0001-xen-xenbus-fix-self-deadlock-after-killing-user-proc.patch @@ -0,0 +1,113 @@ +Patch-mainline: v5.4-rc2 +Git-commit: a8fabb38525c51a094607768bac3ba46b3f4a9d5 +References: bsc#1065600 +From: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> +Date: Tue, 1 Oct 2019 17:03:55 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] xen/xenbus: fix self-deadlock after killing user process + +In case a user process using xenbus has open transactions and is killed +e.g. via ctrl-C the following cleanup of the allocated resources might +result in a deadlock due to trying to end a transaction in the xenbus +worker thread: + +[ 2551.474706] INFO: task xenbus:37 blocked for more than 120 seconds. +[ 2551.492215] Tainted: P OE 5.0.0-29-generic #5 +[ 2551.510263] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. +[ 2551.528585] xenbus D 0 37 2 0x80000080 +[ 2551.528590] Call Trace: +[ 2551.528603] __schedule+0x2c0/0x870 +[ 2551.528606] ? _cond_resched+0x19/0x40 +[ 2551.528632] schedule+0x2c/0x70 +[ 2551.528637] xs_talkv+0x1ec/0x2b0 +[ 2551.528642] ? wait_woken+0x80/0x80 +[ 2551.528645] xs_single+0x53/0x80 +[ 2551.528648] xenbus_transaction_end+0x3b/0x70 +[ 2551.528651] xenbus_file_free+0x5a/0x160 +[ 2551.528654] xenbus_dev_queue_reply+0xc4/0x220 +[ 2551.528657] xenbus_thread+0x7de/0x880 +[ 2551.528660] ? wait_woken+0x80/0x80 +[ 2551.528665] kthread+0x121/0x140 +[ 2551.528667] ? xb_read+0x1d0/0x1d0 +[ 2551.528670] ? kthread_park+0x90/0x90 +[ 2551.528673] ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40 + +Fix this by doing the cleanup via a workqueue instead. + +Reported-by: James Dingwall <james@dingwall.me.uk> +Fixes: fd8aa9095a95c ("xen: optimize xenbus driver for multiple concurrent xenstore accesses") +Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.11 +Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> +Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> +Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> +--- + drivers/xen/xenbus/xenbus_dev_frontend.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++-- + 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/drivers/xen/xenbus/xenbus_dev_frontend.c b/drivers/xen/xenbus/xenbus_dev_frontend.c +index 08adc590f631..597af455a522 100644 +--- a/drivers/xen/xenbus/xenbus_dev_frontend.c ++++ b/drivers/xen/xenbus/xenbus_dev_frontend.c +@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ + #include <linux/string.h> + #include <linux/slab.h> + #include <linux/miscdevice.h> ++#include <linux/workqueue.h> + + #include <xen/xenbus.h> + #include <xen/xen.h> +@@ -116,6 +117,8 @@ struct xenbus_file_priv { + wait_queue_head_t read_waitq; + + struct kref kref; ++ ++ struct work_struct wq; + }; + + /* Read out any raw xenbus messages queued up. */ +@@ -300,14 +303,14 @@ static void watch_fired(struct xenbus_watch *watch, + mutex_unlock(&adap->dev_data->reply_mutex); + } + +-static void xenbus_file_free(struct kref *kref) ++static void xenbus_worker(struct work_struct *wq) + { + struct xenbus_file_priv *u; + struct xenbus_transaction_holder *trans, *tmp; + struct watch_adapter *watch, *tmp_watch; + struct read_buffer *rb, *tmp_rb; + +- u = container_of(kref, struct xenbus_file_priv, kref); ++ u = container_of(wq, struct xenbus_file_priv, wq); + + /* + * No need for locking here because there are no other users, +@@ -333,6 +336,18 @@ static void xenbus_file_free(struct kref *kref) + kfree(u); + } + ++static void xenbus_file_free(struct kref *kref) ++{ ++ struct xenbus_file_priv *u; ++ ++ /* ++ * We might be called in xenbus_thread(). ++ * Use workqueue to avoid deadlock. ++ */ ++ u = container_of(kref, struct xenbus_file_priv, kref); ++ schedule_work(&u->wq); ++} ++ + static struct xenbus_transaction_holder *xenbus_get_transaction( + struct xenbus_file_priv *u, uint32_t tx_id) + { +@@ -650,6 +665,7 @@ static int xenbus_file_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp) + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&u->watches); + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&u->read_buffers); + init_waitqueue_head(&u->read_waitq); ++ INIT_WORK(&u->wq, xenbus_worker); + + mutex_init(&u->reply_mutex); + mutex_init(&u->msgbuffer_mutex); +-- +2.16.4 + diff --git a/patches.suse/alarmtimer-Use-EOPNOTSUPP-instead-of-ENOTSUPP.patch b/patches.suse/alarmtimer-Use-EOPNOTSUPP-instead-of-ENOTSUPP.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c294bfef40 --- /dev/null +++ b/patches.suse/alarmtimer-Use-EOPNOTSUPP-instead-of-ENOTSUPP.patch @@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ +From f18ddc13af981ce3c7b7f26925f099e7c6929aba Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> +Date: Tue, 3 Sep 2019 14:18:02 -0300 +Patch-mainline: v5.4-rc1 +Git-commit: f18ddc13af981ce3c7b7f26925f099e7c6929aba +References: bsc#1151680 +Subject: [PATCH] alarmtimer: Use EOPNOTSUPP instead of ENOTSUPP + +ENOTSUPP is not supposed to be returned to userspace. This was found on an +OpenPower machine, where the RTC does not support set_alarm. + +On that system, a clock_nanosleep(CLOCK_REALTIME_ALARM, ...) results in +"524 Unknown error 524" + +Replace it with EOPNOTSUPP which results in the expected "95 Operation not +supported" error. + +Fixes: 1c6b39ad3f01 (alarmtimers: Return -ENOTSUPP if no RTC device is present) +Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> +Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> +Signed-off-by: Petr Vorel <pvorel@suse.cz> +Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org +Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190903171802.28314-1-cascardo@canonical.com +--- + kernel/time/alarmtimer.c | 4 ++-- + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/kernel/time/alarmtimer.c b/kernel/time/alarmtimer.c +index 57518efc3810..b7d75a9e8ccf 100644 +--- a/kernel/time/alarmtimer.c ++++ b/kernel/time/alarmtimer.c +@@ -672,7 +672,7 @@ static int alarm_timer_create(struct k_itimer *new_timer) + enum alarmtimer_type type; + + if (!alarmtimer_get_rtcdev()) +- return -ENOTSUPP; ++ return -EOPNOTSUPP; + + if (!capable(CAP_WAKE_ALARM)) + return -EPERM; +@@ -790,7 +790,7 @@ static int alarm_timer_nsleep(const clockid_t which_clock, int flags, + int ret = 0; + + if (!alarmtimer_get_rtcdev()) +- return -ENOTSUPP; ++ return -EOPNOTSUPP; + + if (flags & ~TIMER_ABSTIME) + return -EINVAL; +-- +2.16.4 + diff --git a/series.conf b/series.conf index e41611d8ea..b27cc78979 100644 --- a/series.conf +++ b/series.conf @@ -24635,6 +24635,7 @@ patches.suse/iommu-dma-fix-for-dereferencing-before-null-checking patches.suse/qla2xxx-remove-SGI-SN2-support.patch patches.suse/platform-x86-pmc_atom-Add-Siemens-SIMATIC-IPC227E-to.patch + patches.suse/alarmtimer-Use-EOPNOTSUPP-instead-of-ENOTSUPP.patch patches.suse/md-raid6-Set-R5_ReadError-when-there-is-read-failure.patch patches.suse/blk-mq-fix-memory-leak-in-blk_mq_init_allocated_queue-error.patch patches.suse/md-only-call-set_in_sync-when-it-is-expected-to-succ.patch @@ -24824,6 +24825,8 @@ patches.suse/0001-btrfs-relocation-fix-use-after-free-on-dead-relocati.patch patches.suse/0001-btrfs-qgroup-Fix-the-wrong-target-io_tree-when-freei.patch patches.suse/0002-btrfs-qgroup-Fix-reserved-data-space-leak-if-we-have.patch + patches.suse/0001-xen-xenbus-fix-self-deadlock-after-killing-user-proc.patch + patches.suse/0001-xen-netfront-do-not-use-0U-as-error-return-value-for.patch # davem/net-next patches.suse/msft-hv-1766-hv_netvsc-fix-vf-serial-matching-with-pci-slot-info.patch |