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authorVladislav Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>2006-05-19 14:25:53 -0700
committerChris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>2006-05-20 15:00:34 -0700
commit1a9807fd86f9a112a39720e99be4eeae7b4e3694 (patch)
tree441c5c7eeb5fbe0cdf44f41c3e85a2ec862949f9
parent0eca2317be1345e056fb75d256099a04c97f7021 (diff)
[PATCH] SCTP: Validate the parameter length in HB-ACK chunk (CVE-2006-1857)
If SCTP receives a badly formatted HB-ACK chunk, it is possible that we may access invalid memory and potentially have a buffer overflow. We should really make sure that the chunk format is what we expect, before attempting to touch the data. Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com> Signed-off-by: Sridhar Samudrala <sri@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
-rw-r--r--net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c6
1 files changed, 6 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
index 8cdba51ec076..9395e098ae29 100644
--- a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
+++ b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
@@ -1030,6 +1030,12 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_backbeat_8_3(const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
commands);
hbinfo = (sctp_sender_hb_info_t *) chunk->skb->data;
+ /* Make sure that the length of the parameter is what we expect */
+ if (ntohs(hbinfo->param_hdr.length) !=
+ sizeof(sctp_sender_hb_info_t)) {
+ return SCTP_DISPOSITION_DISCARD;
+ }
+
from_addr = hbinfo->daddr;
link = sctp_assoc_lookup_paddr(asoc, &from_addr);