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authorDan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>2018-02-23 14:06:21 -0800
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2018-02-28 10:18:34 +0100
commit22b5557f1fef4adaddfc9fe6a0cd72d0be69bef1 (patch)
tree763e46c1d445920a8b3c7409da617a20968fbee6
parent78b1cb3fe38a509dc0fdbdb52c742d4630db7502 (diff)
x86/entry/64: Clear extra registers beyond syscall arguments, to reduce speculation attack surface
commit 8e1eb3fa009aa7c0b944b3c8b26b07de0efb3200 upstream. At entry userspace may have (maliciously) populated the extra registers outside the syscall calling convention with arbitrary values that could be useful in a speculative execution (Spectre style) attack. Clear these registers to minimize the kernel's attack surface. Note, this only clears the extra registers and not the unused registers for syscalls less than 6 arguments, since those registers are likely to be clobbered well before their values could be put to use under speculation. Note, Linus found that the XOR instructions can be executed with minimized cost if interleaved with the PUSH instructions, and Ingo's analysis found that R10 and R11 should be included in the register clearing beyond the typical 'extra' syscall calling convention registers. Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Reported-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/151787988577.7847.16733592218894189003.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com [ Made small improvements to the changelog and the code comments. ] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S13
1 files changed, 13 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
index db5009ce065a..8d7e4d48db0d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
@@ -176,13 +176,26 @@ GLOBAL(entry_SYSCALL_64_after_swapgs)
pushq %r8 /* pt_regs->r8 */
pushq %r9 /* pt_regs->r9 */
pushq %r10 /* pt_regs->r10 */
+ /*
+ * Clear extra registers that a speculation attack might
+ * otherwise want to exploit. Interleave XOR with PUSH
+ * for better uop scheduling:
+ */
+ xorq %r10, %r10 /* nospec r10 */
pushq %r11 /* pt_regs->r11 */
+ xorq %r11, %r11 /* nospec r11 */
pushq %rbx /* pt_regs->rbx */
+ xorl %ebx, %ebx /* nospec rbx */
pushq %rbp /* pt_regs->rbp */
+ xorl %ebp, %ebp /* nospec rbp */
pushq %r12 /* pt_regs->r12 */
+ xorq %r12, %r12 /* nospec r12 */
pushq %r13 /* pt_regs->r13 */
+ xorq %r13, %r13 /* nospec r13 */
pushq %r14 /* pt_regs->r14 */
+ xorq %r14, %r14 /* nospec r14 */
pushq %r15 /* pt_regs->r15 */
+ xorq %r15, %r15 /* nospec r15 */
/* IRQs are off. */
movq %rsp, %rdi